# Byrne, A. (2012): Knowing what i see

PDF Link

## The transparency proposal

One can come to know that one ϕ’s that p (where ϕ indicates some propositional attitude) by means of an inference whose sole premise concerns one’s environment (viz., whether p) [this is a slight revision to Byrne’s claim on p. 188]

## The evidential objection

The facts revealed by attending to one’s environment (e.g. to seeing the hawk) are at best very weak evidence that one ϕ’s that p (p.

## The amodal objection

The apparent root of the difficulty is that information does not wear its provenace does not wear its provenance from a particular sensory modality on its face—information is amodal.

## Are there alternatives to transparency?

### Option 2: Mental evidence

1. Visual sensation

2. Visual experience

## Epistemic rules

KNOW: If p, believe that you know that p

• KNOW is self-verifying. Are there epistemic rules which aren’t self-verifying but nevertheless reliably yield knowledge?

• After much discussion, Byrne argues for:

SEE: If […x…]V and x is an F, believe that you seen F

### Answering the Amodal objection

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