Byrne, A. (2012): Knowing what i see

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The transparency proposal

One can come to know that one ϕ’s that p (where ϕ indicates some propositional attitude) by means of an inference whose sole premise concerns one’s environment (viz., whether p) [this is a slight revision to Byrne’s claim on p. 188]

The evidential objection

The facts revealed by attending to one’s environment (e.g. to seeing the hawk) are at best very weak evidence that one ϕ’s that p (p.

The amodal objection

The apparent root of the difficulty is that information does not wear its provenace does not wear its provenance from a particular sensory modality on its face—information is amodal.

Are there alternatives to transparency?

Option 1: Non-observational knowledge

Option 2: Mental evidence

  1. Visual sensation

  2. Visual experience

Epistemic rules

KNOW: If p, believe that you know that p

  • KNOW is self-verifying. Are there epistemic rules which aren’t self-verifying but nevertheless reliably yield knowledge?

  • After much discussion, Byrne argues for:

SEE: If […x…]V and x is an F, believe that you seen F

Answering the evidential objection

Answering the Amodal objection

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