author = {Cramer, Konrad},
  title = {Nicht-reine synthetische Urteile a priori},
  volume = {},
  pages = {},
  editor = {},
  publisher = {Carl Winter Universitätsverlag},
  address = {Heidelberg},
  year = {1985},
  langid = {german},
file = {/Users/Roambot/Dropbox/Work/MasterLib/cramer1985 Nicht-reine synthetische Urteile a priori.pdf},
  abstract = {},
  keywords = {@definition; judgment; kant; matter; motion; science}}

Cramer has a good discussion of issues surrounding <motion> in the MFNS. He also is aware that we cannot simply understand the content of <matter> as stipulated, as in a nominal definition. He says,

Gegen eine solche terminiologische Festsetzung erhebt sich allerdings der Verdacht, daß sie eine in der Sache nichts entscheidende bloße Nominaldefinition des Begriffs der Materie ist, die, wie alle bloße Nominaldefinitionen, den Einwand auf sich zieht, Resultat terminologisher Willkür zu sein. [@cramer1985, 136]

Cramer thinks this objection can be avoided, but I’m not totally clear as to how. Part of his point seems to hinge on the claim that the “metaphysical exposition” which Kant gives at Phoronomy, 4:481 is aimed at expositing the concept <object of the outer senses> rather than <matter> [@cramer1985, 136-7].

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