Attempt at a new interpretation of the argument of the TD that does not impute “subjectivism” to Kant. What is subjectivism? It isn’t totally clear, but it is something along the lines of the view that the categories are merely necessary conditions of representation rather than conditions of what is represented.
I found the discussion almost totally unconvincing, with what seemed to me a rather uncharitable treatment of Strawson (and perhaps even of Kitcher!). The paper has the virtue of making relatively clear what JS thinks the arc of the TD is, but it provides virtually no support for most of its claims, which are, on their face, rather implausible.
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the discussion of judgment is just bizarre. JS seems to think that one cannot judge without an intuition to which one appeals. This seems to completely ignore the B Preface note that one can think whatever one likes. JS thus seems to run together thought/judgment with cognition.
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JS gives a very clear statement of commitment to the premise principle (more clearly than even McDowell) on p. 278. He provides no textual discussion or justification for this ascription, nor does he discuss it within the broader context of Kant’s conception of justification.
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The position is very clearly a form of conceptualism, which goes along with the position in @shaddock2017.