- Tags
- Kant, German Idealism
- See also
- Kant on substance and power, Kant’s map of the mind
(This is a slight modification of (Wuerth 2014)): Representations in the faculty of
pleasure and displeasure, by contrast with those of the faculty of cognition, do not
relate to independent actualities, but merely to how an object affects the subject,
and in particular whether the object causes a feeling in the subject of the
advancement of or hindrance to the subject’s “life” (AF, 25:559 [1775/6]; R 3855,
17:313 [1764–8]; Me, 25:1068 [1781/2]; ML 1 , 28:246–7 [1777–80]; R 1021 15:457
[1773–9]; cf. OFBS, 2:299 [1764]; R 651, 15:288 [1769–70]), i.e., the advancement of
or hindrance to the subject’s “inner principle of self–activity,” or their desire (ML
1 , 28:247 [1777–80]; MMr, 29:894 [1782–3]; CPrR, 5:23 [1788]; ML 2 28:587 [1790–1]).
These representations can also be understood in terms of their effects, insofar as
they can serve as efficient causes of a subjective sort, for producing or maintaining
themselves as pleasures (MD, 28:675 [1792–3] and MK 2 , 28:741 [early 1790s]; CPJ,
First Introduction, 20:206 [1789]; ML 2 , 28:586 [1790–1]).
(Again from Wuerth) Whereas the representations of the faculty of pleasure and displeasure have
subjective causality, the representations of the faculty of desire have objective
causality (AC, 25:206 [1772/3]; MD, 28:675 [1792–3]; MK 2 , 28:737, 741 [early
1790s]; CPJ, First Introduction, 20:206; CPrR, 9n [1788]; MM, 6:211–14 [1797]). That
is, the representations of the faculty of desire do not merely act to reproduce
themselves as representations but instead can serve to cause the objects of these
representations in accordance with the satisfaction taken in the object (ML 2 ,
28:587 [1790–1]). Despite the similarity of desire and feeling insofar as both serve
as causes of something, desire is similar to cognition (and dissimilar to feeling) in
relating to an object, though to produce this object rather than know it.
617-726-2835
Bibliography
Wuerth, Julian. 2014. Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.